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1  Introduction
1  
Namibia is known to be the most arid country south of the Sahara. Average annual rainfall is 
not only relatively low in most parts of the country, it is also highly variable. Only 8 per cent of 
the country receives enough rain during a normal rainy season to practice rainfed cultivation. At 
the same time between 60 per cent and 70 per cent of the population depend on subsistence 
agro-pastoralism in non-freehold or communal areas. Against the background of rising unem-
ployment, the livelihoods of the majority of these people are likely to depend on natural re-
sources in the foreseeable future.  
Natural resources generally are under considerable strain. As the rural population increases, so 
is the demand for natural resources, land and water specifically. Dependency on subsistence 
farming which is the result of large scale rural poverty exacerbates the problem. Large parts of 
the country are stocked injudiciously, resulting in overgrazing and water is frequently over-
abstracted, leading to declining water tables (MET 2005: 2). 
Unequal access to both land and water has prompted government to introduce reforms in these 
sectors. These reforms were guided by the desire to manage resources more sustainably while 
providing more equal access to them. In terms of NDP 2, sustainability means to use natural 
resources in such a way so as not to ‘compromise the ability of future generations to make use 
of these resources’ (NDP 2: 595).  
Immediately after Independence government started reform processes in the land and water 
sectors. However, these reforms have happened at different paces and largely independent of 
each other. Increasingly policy makers and development practitioners realised that land and 
water management needed to be integrated, as decisions about land management and land use 
options had a direct impact on water resources. Conversely the availability of water sets the 
parameters for what is possible in terms of agricultural production and other land uses. The 
north-central regions face a particular challenge in this regard as the region carries more live-
stock than it can sustain in the long run. At the same time, close to half the households do not 
own any livestock. Access to livestock by these households would improve their abilities to 
cultivate their land more efficiently in order to feed themselves and thus reduce poverty levels. 
But livestock are a major consumer of water. In 2000 livestock was consuming more water than 
the domestic sector. The figures were 77Mm3/a and 67Mm3/a respectively (Urban et al. 2003 
Annex 7: 2). This situation has prompted a Project Progress Report on the Namibia Water Re-
sources Management Review in 2003 to conclude that 
Given the extreme water scarcity in most parts of the country, land and water issues are closely 
linked. It therefore seems indispensable to mutually adjust land – and water sector reform proc-
esses (Ibid: 20).   
This paper will briefly look at four institutions that are central to land and water management 
with a view to assess the extent to which they interact. These are Communal Land Boards, Wa-
ter Point Committees, Traditional Authorities and Regional Councils. A discussion of relevant 
policy documents and legislative instruments will investigate whether the existing policy fra-
mework provides for an integrated approach or not. Before doing this, it appears sensible to 
briefly situate these four institutions in the wider maze of institutions operating at regional and 
sub-regional level. All these institutions – important as they are in the quest to improve partici-
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pation at the regional and sub-regional level – are competing for time and input from small-
scale farmers.    
 
   
2  Participation and decentralisation 
During his introduction of Namibia’s decentralisation policy in Parliament, the Minister of Re-
gional, Local Government and Housing stated that the ability of people to make their own po-
litical, cultural, social and developmental decisions at their own level was the only guarantor for 
democracy. Moreover, the only safeguard of sustainable development was when people partici-
pated in setting their own priorities, and planning, implementing and monitoring them (MRLGH 
1997: 1). With regard to the environment, the Decentralisation Policy stated that it was impera-
tive for all people to participate extensively at all levels and to apply traditional and modern 
knowledge in order to bring about sustainable development.  
An institutional framework designed to promote and encourage grassroots participation in pol-
icy and development matters was implemented as part of Decentralisation. Regional Councils 
were established in all 13 regions of the country. In terms of the Regional Councils Act, 1992, 
the functions and duties of Regional Councils include the planning of development in their re-
spective regions. More specifically, Regional Councils are responsible for the planning of water 
infrastructure and the general utilisation of land, considering the sensitivities of the natural envi-
ronment (Article 28). Each region has a Directorate of Planning and Development Services 
which will gradually take up these responsibilities. 
At the sub-regional level, Constituency Development Committees are responsible for identify-
ing community needs and to develop plans and proposals for submission to Regional Councils. 
The CDCs are chaired by the Regional Councillor of the constituency. (S)he constitutes the link 
between constituencies and the Regional Council. In the north-central regions, Regional Coun-
cillors generally co-operate very closely with traditional leaders at village level. The latter or 
their representatives are represented on CDCs. More generally, however, it is not clear how 
representative members of CDCs are of communities in their constituencies. Most people spo-
ken to during PPAs in the north-central regions did not know how members of CDCs were se-
lected. What was clear, however, was that they were not elected.  
Development issues and problems identified by communities – which could include needs for 
additional water points, for example – are fed to CDCs by Traditional Leaders where they are 
discussed and decisions are taken. Decisions and proposal taken by CDCs are submitted to Re-
gional  Development  Co-ordinating  Committees  (RDCCs)  which  are  responsible  for  the  co-
ordination of development inputs. At present, RDCCs only have consultative functions and no 
decision making powers. Recent Poverty Monitors carried out in all regions indicated that all 
budgets are decided at National Level, for the RCs, for the CDCs and line ministries. 
In the north-central regions Regional Councillors, although being politicians, are rural institu-
tions in their own rights on account of the fact that they provide the single most important link 
between villagers and government institutions. However, in other regions such as Hardap, for 
example, they never call meetings, according to communities and the RC Planners. In north-
central they not only provided important services, but also direct developments in their constitu-
encies by dint of the fact they serve and chair several committees such as Drought Relief Com-
mittees for example. During the recent PPA in the north-central regions most communities ap-
peared to be satisfied with their relations with Regional Councillors and Traditional Leaders.      
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While the Decentralisation Policy sets out the overall framework for decentralisation, some line 
ministries had incorporated the principle of decentralisation into their policies before a formal 
policy on decentralisation was in place. The National Agricultural Policy of 1995, for example, 
committed the Ministry to give ‘greater autonomy and responsibility to local government au-
thorities for decentralised development planning and management of natural resources’ (Ibid: 
16). The same Ministry developed a policy to transfer the ownership of water points to commu-
nities of water users and provided for the establishment of Water Point Committees to take care 
of the day to day management of water points. The Ministry of Environment and Tourism not 
only developed policy which provided for the transfer of rights and responsibilities regarding 
the utilisation of natural resources to local users, but implemented these policies in the form of 
conservancies. However, the MET exercises tight control from Windhoek. More recently, forest 
legislation provided for the establishment of community forests. 
 
  
3  Customary land and water management
2   
Traditionally, land in the north-central regions belonged to the Traditional Authority of a par-
ticular group. The latter was headed by a King. The land under his jurisdiction was divided into 
a number of ‘districts’ under the authority of Senior Headmen who were responsible directly to 
the Traditional Council. ‘Districts’ in turn were subdivided into wards or omikunda (omukunda, 
sg.). These were granted to people who could make a payment for such land. Upon acquisition 
of an omukunda the new ‘owner’ became headman with certain rights and responsibilities. The-
se included that they could allocate land to individual households against payment of a fee.  
Land allocation is administered according to the type of usage. Headman could allocate land for 
residential and cropping purposes, and rights to such allocations amounted to permanent usu-
fruct. They included rights of first access to waterholes, wells and trees on or near the plot.  
Headmen could not allocate grazing rights to anybody, as grazing land belonged to the tradi-
tional authority on behalf of its subjects. Although settlements did not have exclusive rights of 
access to grazing land, usage of such land was essentially controlled through the ownership and 
control of water points. Typically, the person who dug a well and developed it became the ‘ow-
ner’ of the water point, and in this way obtained control over grazing within a certain area.  
However, water itself was incapable of exclusive ownership. While the owner of a well had the 
right to satisfy his water demands first, rights to wells were characterised by reciprocity and 
access was negotiated. Neighbours who assisted in the maintenance of the well were allowed to 
draw water, but also people who passed through with their livestock. This established a network 
between different owners of wells and their communities, which allowed for herd mobility.  
A fundamental criterion as to whether a newcomer should be given permission to settle in an 
area with his livestock was whether the resources of the area could sustain his livestock and 
whether the existing settlers would accept him. This suggests that land and water resources were 
considered before giving permission to a new settler in a particular area. In this way livestock 
numbers could be matched to the seasonal variability of water.  
The introduction of government boreholes gradually undermined this system and effectively 
separated the integrated management and control of water and land. Where ownership and con-
                                                       
2   This section is based on the contributions in Cox et al. 1998 ‘The privatisation of rangeland resources 
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trol of water points – and by implication of land – previously vested in communities, new bore-
holes were owned by the state, which did not transfer any management responsibilities to com-
munities of users. Property rights over land and water respectively were thus located in two 
separate jurisdictions: Traditional Authorities and the Department of Water Affairs and For-
estry. 
The effects of these developments have been discussed elsewhere in more detail (E.g. Vlachos, 
1995; Cox et al. 1998). Suffice to say, therefore, that in Oshikoto Region these developments 
have not only led to more permanent utilisation of grazing areas by larger numbers of livestock, 
but also to the rapid privatisation of government boreholes and surrounding grazing land. This 
in turn impacted negatively on transhumance patterns and reduced the availability of seasonal 
grazing and access to water for communal farmers. Henceforth, access to water on fenced land 
was controlled by individuals who were wealthy enough to fence off boreholes.  
This process of what Vlachos (1995: 14) has called the separation of private and communal 
interests was further accelerated by increasing population numbers and the gradual transition 
from subsistence agriculture in certain sectors of rural communities. Village economies have 
become increasingly open economic systems displaying a variety of livelihoods strategies which 
in some instances decreased the dependence on natural resources. In addition, local level man-
agement institutions such as Traditional Authorities were gradually integrated into a larger ad-
ministrative  system.  Administrative  units,  for  example,  cut  across  territorially-based  user 
groups, shifting gravity from local level institutions towards sub-regional, regional and national 
structures. Local level institutions are therefore being marginalised. Some evidence of this will 
be provided in the discussion of Communal Land Boards below.  
To sum up: Traditional Authorities are increasingly unable to manage land and natural resources 
effectively. The privatisation of communal grazing areas is a manifestation of the fact that the 
former were no longer able to enforce minimum common property rules, viz. controlling who 
had access to land and water. Integrated land and water management requires that community 
control over these resources must be strengthened. However, as Lawry (1990: 407) has ob-
served,  
Local common property management will not emerge simply by giving greater official rein to 
local action. Policy initiatives will have little impact unless an important array of incentives 
supportive of common property management are operating at the local level. 
He reminded the reader that ‘collective action is more likely to result where the common re-
source is critical to local incomes and is scarce’. On the other hand, collective action will be 
more difficult to achieve where interest in the resource as a source of income varied, or where 
resource use strategies differ significantly’ (Ibid: 410; 413). Finally, increasing scarcity of re-
sources may lead to increased competition for access to those resources, rather than increased 
co-operation.  
Interventions seeking to empower local communities thus need to understand the incentives and 
disincentives of communities to participate in community based resource management, which 
presupposes some form of common property. 
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4  Land Boards 
It is against the background of customary tenure systems that are being undermined gradually 
that the Communal Land Reform Act was introduced in 2002. The objectives of the Act are: 
To provide for the allocation of rights in respect of communal land; to establish Communal 
Land Boards; to provide for the powers of Chiefs and Traditional Authorities and boards in 
relation to communal land; and to make provision for incidental matters. 
The Act provided for land boards to be established for a whole region or part of a region. At 
present, Land Boards have been established in all Regions which have communal areas. The 
exception is Khomas as the region does not have any communal land. Land Boards are therefore 
referred to as Communal Land Boards (CLB). 
 
4.1   Composition of Land Boards  
Members of Communal Land Boards are appointed by the Minister of Lands and Resettlement, 
not by vote. But the Act prescribes the composition of CLBs as follows: 
·  one  representative  from  each  Recognised Traditional  Authority  within  the  Board’s  area 
nominated by such authorities; 
·  one person to represent the organized farming community in the Board’s area;  
·  a regional officer of a regional council in the Board’s area; 
·  two women engaged in farming activities within the Board’s area; 
·  two women with expert knowledge relevant to the functions of the Board; 
·  one person representing a conservancy(s) jointly, where these exist within the Board’s area;  
·  one staff member from each of the following ministries: 
  (a) Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
  (b) Agriculture, Water and Rural Development 
  (c) Regional and Local Government and Housing 
  (d) Environment and Tourism 
Members of CLBs serve for a period of 3 years, but may be reappointed. About half the mem-
bers of CLBs are civil servants representing line ministries with some responsibilities regarding 
land, water and natural resources. Often, civil servants at regional level are fairly junior and may 
be new to a region. Local level representation is weak, being mediated by one representative of 
the Traditional Authority and three other members who in one way or another are members of 
the farming community. If the number of water points and water point committees per region 
are considered, it is clear that the interactions between water point committees and Communal 
Land Boards are tenuous at best and non-existent at worst. Table 1 provides a summary of the 
total number of water points in the four north-central regions for 2003: 
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Table 1: Total number of water points in north-central regions, 2003 
Region  Total no. of water points 
Oshikoto    702 
Ohangwena    609 
Oshana    298 
Omusati    1065 
                    Source: MAWRD, 2004b: Annex 8 
 
4.2   Responsibilities and mandates of Land Boards 
The primary function of CLBs is to administer land rights in communal areas. There are two 
aspects to this. Firstly, CLBs are tasked to exercise control over the allocation and cancellation 
of customary land rights by Chiefs and Traditional Authorities and to register allocations and 
cancellations of customary land rights as well as customary land transfers in a regional registry.  
CLBs do not allocate customary land rights, a function that is still the responsibility of Tradi-
tional Leaders. However, CLBs have to verify that such allocations satisfy the requirements of 
the CLRA before giving final approval and entering such rights in a regional lands register. The 
objective of this function is to improve tenure security for land rights obtained under customary 
land tenure systems. At present the controlling function of CLBs is limited to customary rights 
to residential and arable land. Their mandates are thus limited to individual rights which are 
defined by customary law and which are spatially bounded. Where this is not the case as in 
communal grazing areas, CLBs have no responsibility at present.  
The second aspect concerns the introduction of leases over communal land. CLB are to consider 
applications for leasehold and keep registers of all allocations, cancellations and transfers of 
lease agreements lasting less than 10 years in a regional land register.  
Communal Land Boards do not appear to have any responsibilities regarding natural resources 
management. Instead, the National Land Policy foresees the establishment of a Land Use and 
Environmental Board. In terms of the National Land Policy this Board will operate at national 
level, and will have the responsibility to co-ordinate different line ministries in developing land 
use plans and promoting sound land administration and environmental protection. In developing 
land use plans the LUEB is required to consult with Regional Land Boards on matters which 
will affect the administration of land rights. The latter in turn are expected to ‘liaise closely with 
Regional Councils in connection with their land use planning functions as Regional Councils 
have overall responsibility for development planning’ (MLRR 1998: 16-17). 
The LUEB does not have a legal basis as yet and thus remains dormant, despite a recommenda-
tion made by the PTT in its report on findings in 2005 that it should be established as soon as 
possible (MLR 2005b: 19). It must be pointed out, however, that this recommendation was not 
put forward in the Strategic Options and Action Plan for Land Reform in Namibia which was 
submitted to Cabinet (MLR 2005a). It was on the basis of this report that Cabinet pronounced 
itself on land reform in April 2006. 
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4.2.1  Land use planning 
Despite the fact that the LUEB has not been established as yet and was not regarded as impor-
tant enough to be submitted to Cabinet as part of the PTT Strategic Options, the MLR regards 
the development of integrated land use plans as a mechanism to integrate environmental con-
straints and opportunities with land utilisation. In 2002 the MLRR appointed consultants to 
draw up a National Land Use Planning Policy (IDC 2002), the objective of which was ‘ to cre-
ate the physical environment necessary for present and future generations to gain optimal bene-
fit from the equitable and sustainable utilisation of Namibia’s natural resources’. The principles 
and norms applying to land use planning identified by the consultants include sustainability and 
the integration of ‘separate and diverse elements involved in development planning and land 
use’ in order to be combined and co-ordinated into a more complete and harmonious whole. In 
this regard the integration of water resources was regarded as crucial. More specifically, the 
National Water Policy White Paper implied that the impact of land use in line with catchment 
boundaries be considered and not only manmade boundaries. Land use planners needed to con-
sider Information on existing surface and underground water resources in drawing up land use 
plans. In addition, co-ordination of water point committees and Communal Land Boards was 
essential (IDC 2002: 14).  
Integrated land use plans for Caprivi (2000) and north-central regions (2001) have been com-
plete, but still cannot be legally enforced, and thus remain guidelines for spatial development 
and possible land use options. 
 
4.3   The role of traditional authorities and their mandates 
Traditional Authorities continue to play an important role in land administration, although their 
functions have been subordinated to CLBs. The initial allocation of communal land for residen-
tial and cultivation purposes remains the responsibility of Traditional Authorities, and no person 
is allowed to cultivate any land or take up residence and erect a structure on communal land 
without the written approval of the Traditional Authority and subsequent ratification of such 
approval by a CLB. The same provisions apply to the obstruction of water points on common-
ages and the interference with windmills, water pumps, water pipes dams or storage tanks.  
The powers exercised by Traditional Authorities are controlled by CLBs, which can veto alloca-
tions made by Traditional Authorities. This will happen where the size of customary allocations 
exceeds the maximum size prescribed by the CLRA or where land rights have been allocated in 
respect of land to which another person holds rights already. Finally, where Traditional Authori-
ties allocate land ‘which is reserved for common usage or any other purpose in the public inter-
est’ CLBs are obliged to cancel those allocations. 
The CLRA empowers Traditional Authorities to impose conditions on the utilisation of com-
munal grazing areas. These include the kinds and numbers of livestock that may be grazed and 
the sections of common grazing areas where stock may be grazed ‘and the grazing in rotation on 
different sections’. It must be pointed out that these powers are new powers. Lawry (1990: 417-
418) has observed that centralised control over livestock was not a feature of pastoralism in 
Africa, where independent decision making constituted an important element of opportunistic 
grazing management. In view of this and given the fact that in many cases Traditional Authori-
ties were unable to enforce minimum tenure rights, i.e. rights of access to grazing, it is not likely 
that Traditional Authorities will perform these functions and responsibilities any time soon. For CuveWaters Papers, No. 1 
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practical purposes therefore, communal grazing areas are likely to remain under open access for 
grazing purposes.  
Traditional Authorities also have to consent to the alienation of communal land for leasehold 
purposes. Where a CLB feels that Traditional Authorities withhold consent unreasonably, it 
may submit the matter to an arbitrator to be appointed by the Minister. The Minister is obliged 
to appoint a person who has been approved by the Traditional Authority and the Land Board, 
but may disregard these provisions if either one or both of the two institutions fail to communi-
cate with the Minister or, on a third occasion, communicate their disapproval of a proposed 
person.  
Although the CLRA allocates significant functions to Traditional Authorities, the overall ten-
dency of current land policy and legislation is to decrease the powers of Traditional Authorities 
in land administration and thus more generally. Apart from being controlled by CLB, the grad-
ual transformation of customary land tenure towards leasehold implies that large tracts of land 
will be alienated from their jurisdiction. This means that the area of land under their jurisdiction 
will decrease. Draft proposals to allocate property rights to land to village communities are like-
ly to reinforce this trend. 
 
4.4   Group rights to non-freehold land 
Land Boards and Traditional Authorities are primarily responsible for the administration of 
customary or leasehold rights held and/or claimed by individuals or individual households. The 
parcel of land over which rights are to be registered must be spatially defined in one way or 
another. This raises the question how customary rights to land that is being utilised on a com-
munal basis will be dealt with. In view of the possibility that some of that land may be alienated 
for agricultural development under leasehold, this appears to be a pertinent question. 
Regrettably, neither the National Land Policy nor the Communal Land Reform Act provide any 
conclusive answers. In the former, a ‘strategy to promote group tenure through a Regional Land 
Board’ is alluded to. This suggests that the possibility of granting land rights to groups has been 
discussed in government circles, but the NLP did not pursue this matter any further. In order to 
obtain  insights  into  this  policy  issue,  one  has  to  turn  to  the  National  Land  Tenure  Policy 
(NLTP), a final draft of which was completed in January 2005 (MLRR 2005c).  
The NLTP proposes to grant group rights to ‘traditional villages’. It proposes that each Com-
munal Land Board should define and demarcate the boundaries of each village under its juris-
diction. Once identified and demarcated, villages should be registered, thus turning them into 
juristic persona. A register of all ‘rightful members’ of villages should be compiled and updated 
regularly, and village members ‘will be given formal rights over land and all resources in each 
village’. They will also have the right to exclude or include people seeking to join. Members of 
villages will be entitled to a residential plot, an arable holding and the right to ‘have a cattle post 
in the grazing lands. A traditional councillor will be identified for each village. Communal Land 
Boards will be responsible to keep registers of villages as well as records of village members 
(MLRR 2005: 17-18).  
Group rights to natural resources were also discussed briefly by the PTT. It recommended that 
community based resource management should be expanded beyond wildlife and tourism to 
incorporate land and water (MLR 2005a: 36). It is significant that Cabinet endorsed this rec-
ommendation in April 2006. This suggests that at the highest political level the introduction of 
group rights to land has been approved. It is likely, however, that the implementation of this      
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recommendation is not one of the main priorities of government. Amongst other impacts, trans-
ferring rights to land to communities of users will change the balance of rural power in ways 
that cannot be assessed before hand. The position and power of traditional leaders for one will 
change dramatically as they loose control over land. With the loss of influence of traditional 
authorities in rural areas, a major organising structure of rural society will disappear. 
Important as it is to improve tenure security of people to communal grazing, the delimitation of 
villages and the concomitant alienation of land falling outside such villages for agricultural de-
velopment under a leasehold system may have negative impacts on village households and envi-
ronment. It is foreseeable that by fixing village boundaries, transhumance patterns will be ad-
versely affected, increasing pressures on scarce village grazing and water. 
At the same time, property rights over village land will facilitate the introduction of new tech-
nologies in water purification for example, in that a legally constituted village could become the 
owner of such a facility. Without clearly defined property rights, ownership issues may intro-
duce difficulties about responsibilities and duties. 
 
4.5   Water in land policy 
Access to water and how the privatisation of water sources in non-freehold areas will impact on 
customary tenure systems have not been addressed in any great detail in land policy and legisla-
tion. The National Land Policy of 1998 makes reference to rights to natural resources only once 
when it states that tenure rights allocated in terms of the Policy will include rights to all natural 
resources including water, but ‘subject to sustainable utilisation and the details of sectoral pol-
icy and legislation’. Moreover, such rights will be exclusive rights, enforced and supported by 
law. But, states the Policy, ‘the sharing of land and natural resources to mutual benefit between 
neighbours will be encouraged, particularly in times of drought and other stress’ (MLRR 1998: 
11). Where natural resources are not used sustainably, Land Boards will be empowered to ‘ter-
minate or deny the award of title’ (Ibid: 16).  
Despite a commitment to sustainable development, the water issue is not at all articulated in 
land policy and legislation. This stands in stark contrast to some other natural resources. For 
example, Communal Land Boards are required by the CLRA to take into consideration any 
management  or  utilisation  plans  of  conservancies  when  considering  applications  for  lease 
agreements (Jones and Kakujaha-Matundu 2006:11,13). 
 
  
5  Water Associations and Water Point Committees 
In recognition that water was scarce and a limiting factor in economic and social development, 
Government embarked on reforms in the water sector very soon after Independence. At the core 
of these reforms was the gradual devolution of ownership and management responsibilities to 
the level of users. The water sector was the first sector to embrace decentralisation at policy 
level and in its day to day operations. The first policy statement in this regard came in 1993 in 
the form of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Policy which recommended ‘that the decen-
tralisation objective should take precedence over the performance objective’ (MAWRD 1993: 
32). Consequently, it argued that ‘the equitable improvement of services should be the result of 
the combined efforts of the government and the beneficiaries, based on community involve-
ment, participation and responsibility (Ibid: 12). WASP laid down three basic policy principles: CuveWaters Papers, No. 1 
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·  the maximum involvement of users; 
·  the delegation of responsibility to the lowest possible level; and 
·  an environmentally sound utilisation of the water resources (Ibid: 18) 
With regard to communal farmers the WASP proposed that they should be responsible on an 
individual or communal basis for their own water and sanitation facilities. They should own and 
operate their own installations (Ibid: 29). In 1997 approval was given to introduce Community-
based Management of rural water supplies. The aim was to gradually devolve responsibility for 
managing and paying for water services to Water Associations and Water Point Committees 
over a period of time. 
Subsequent to these developments, the entire water resources management set-up was reviewed 
by a team of Namibian consultants with the assistance of expatriate consultants. The work of 
this team resulted in the National Water Policy White Paper, which retained and expanded on 
the principle participation first expounded in WASP. The single most important recommenda-
tion of the White Paper was to manage water resources in an integrated manner at Basin level. A 
review of the NWRMR in September 2003 recommended that the approach should be widened 
to include land. This resulted in the Integrated Land and Water Management approach, which 
was first piloted in the Kuiseb catchment and subsequently introduced on a pilot basis to the 
Cuvelai Basin. 
 
5.1   Group rights to water 
The National Water Policy White Paper regards the participation of stakeholders and decentral-
ised decision making as fundamental to facilitate more equitable access to water resources. In-
stitutions should be developed to facilitate such participation and to devolve decision making to 
the lowest appropriate administrative level (Ibid: 30). Under this decentralised dispensation, the 
role of central government will be limited to policy and standard setting, regulation and facilita-
tion (Ibid: 23). 
The  process  of  establishing  a  new institutional  framework  for  the  management  of  water in 
communal areas was started in the late 1990s, but only obtained legal sanction in the Water 
Resources Management Act of 2004. At the apex of this structure is a Basin Management 
Committee which should be broadly representative of all stakeholders in a Basin. The Act stipu-
lates a number of functions of basin management committees which boil down to the protection, 
development, management and control of water resources within a Basin Management Commit-
tee’s water management area by promoting community participation in all different aspects of 
water management. As the Act is not in force yet, no regulations have been promulgated which 
prescribe the composition of Basin Management Committees. The Act only stipulates that Re-
gional Councils must nominate a person to sit on Basin Management Committees.  
The National Water Policy provides for the full transfer of ownership of water points to com-
munities of users. In order to facilitate proper management of water points, the Act provides for 
the establishment of Water Point User Associations. These will consist of community members 
who permanently use a particular water point for their supply needs, and any rural household 
which regularly uses a particular water point qualifies for membership. However, such member-
ship is mediated by the ability to pay a membership fee and for subsequent use of water. Water 
Point User Associations have the power to permit non-members to use water as well as to ex-
clude any person from the water point who is not complying with the rules, regulations and      
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constitution of a Water User Association. Water Point User Associations have to agree to a 
Constitution before they will be registered.  
With regard to the utilisation of communal land, Water Point User Associations have the power 
‘to plan and control the use of communal land in the immediate vicinity of a water point in co-
operation with the Communal Land Board and the traditional authority concerned’ (Section 19). 
Although it is not clear how the immediate vicinity of a water point is defined, a more signifi-
cant ambiguity exists in the fact that current land policy and legislation does not empower Land 
Boards to plan and control the use of communal land. Regional Councils are the only structure 
at sub-national level with legal powers to draw up development plans in regions. However, the 
Communal Land Reform Act does provide Traditional Authorities with powers to exercise con-
trol over the number of livestock in areas of their jurisdiction and to introduce rotational grazing 
by prohibiting livestock from grazing in parts of their areas.  
The provisions of the Water Act are likely to lead to changes in land tenure if they are imple-
mented properly. Powers to control access to water points imply that Water Point User Associa-
tions can effectively control access to their grazing land. However, the Water Act does not con-
fer any rights to WPCs to exercise control over open water in pans during and after rainy sea-
sons. These open water points are important for livestock owners for as long as they last, usu-
ally  until  about  August-September  in  the  north-central regions.  Open  access to  these  water 
points may limit the powers of WPCs to plan and control the use of communal land that falls 
within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a WPC.  
Current land policy and legislation do not provide for the rights conferred by the Water Act to 
communities of water users. It was mentioned above that the draft Land Tenure Policy proposes 
to register villages as legal entities, thereby conferring land rights to communities. However, a 
review of this draft and existing land policy and legislation is necessary to make it consistent 
with the Water Act. One of the issues that needs to be addressed in such a review is the fact that 
most villages have more than one water point and thus more than one Water Point User Asso-
ciation. For all these institutions to be effective, it is important that clear mandates exist. This is 
not an insurmountable task, but unless it is addressed early, unclear and overlapping mandates 
may result in weakened institutions, unable to control access to natural resources. 
 
5.2   Responsibilities and mandates of Water Point Committees 
The day to day management of a water point – maintenance, control of access, payment etc. – is 
being carried out by Water Point Committees. These consist of not less than 5 members which 
are elected by the Water Point User Association. Local Water User Associations in turn will be 
formed by a group of Water Point User Associations for the purpose of co-ordinating the man-
agement of a particular rural water scheme, such as take-offs from a pipeline.   
Recent participatory poverty assessments in the north-central regions suggested that communi-
ties were generally satisfied with the operations of their WPCs. As members of the Committees 
are elected, WPC were broadly representative of the communities they served. In some in-
stances WPC lacked sufficient skills and capacities to manage their affairs efficiently. However, 
interactions with Land Boards are non-existent, and Traditional leaders do not play a role in 
WPCs. 
It is likely that WPC will assume responsibilities and functions outside their water mandate. 
Research in eastern Namibia has shown that some WPCs have started to address land issues in 
their communities. In Aminuis, for example, the WPC regulated the influx of people wishing to CuveWaters Papers, No. 1 
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come into the settlement for emergency grazing. This involved assessing applicants, drawing up 
contracts with successful applicants and monitoring their stay (Twyman et al. 2002: 11). The 
WPC also discussed the issue of fencing off village grazing areas and has done so after agree-
ment was reached among community members to do so. 
 
5.3   The role of traditional authorities and their mandates 
Traditional Leaders do not have any role to play in the management of water points, as owner-
ship rests with Water User Associations. Although by custom traditional leaders did not have 
any say over the rights to water points, WPC have the potential to gradually erode the powers of 
traditional leaders to administer land. At present there is no evidence to suggest that this is hap-
pening in the north-central regions, but the Aminuis example shows that this may well happen. 
As the demand for access to land with access to water outstrips supply, communities are likely 
to want to protect their land and water against outsiders by fencing it off. Such developments 
will effectively excise such land from the jurisdiction of Traditional Leaders, further eroding 
their authority. 
 
5.4   Land in water policy 
The National Water Policy recognised explicitly that a more effective and sustainable allocation 
of water required a holistic view of the chain of water management from source to consumer. 
Water demands by different sectors needed to be balanced against an environmental and basic 
needs reserve. Such a holistic view, in turn, required that land and water related activities be 
integrated (MAWRD 2000: 21). To do this efficiently, all water related information should be 
synthesised and analysed at basin or catchment level to inform local, regional and national level 
planning initiatives and water related decision making (Ibid: 25).  
Integrated land and water management requires improved intersectoral co-ordination and co-
operation. In recognition of this, the NWP lists a number of important ministries that need to 
better co-ordinated. A significant omission is the MLR, which has become a significant stake-
holder as a result of its responsibility to resettle people on sub-divided land, and the develop-
ment of ‘unutilised’ communal land into small-scale commercial farms (Ibid: 22). 
  
  
6  Conclusions 
Integrated land and water management has been widely accepted as the most sustainable ap-
proach to the management of these scarce resources. A comprehensive policy framework sup-
ported by legislation exists in Namibia. However, the need to integrate is not articulated equally 
clearly in sectoral policies. It is fair to conclude that ILWM is not at all embedded in land policy 
and legislation, beyond a very general commitment to sustainable development. The National 
Water Policy on the other hand is more specific about the need to consider land use issues in 
water management, but did not regard the MLR as important enough a stakeholder to be in-
cluded in the list of ministries that need to be co-ordinated in order to facilitate integrated water 
management. 
Both sectors have established an institutional framework in the form of Communal Land Boards 
and Water Point Committees to facilitate a larger degree of participation in the management of      
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their respective resources. These institutions operate in an environment that is characterised by a 
proliferation of institutions at various levels of governance. Most are designed to increase par-
ticipation. At the lowest level, they operate under the jurisdiction of Traditional Leaders. At a 
higher level, Constituency Development Committees have been established to involve local 
communities in the identification of development problems and solutions. At regional level 
Regional Councils are responsible for overall planning in a region. To facilitate this Regional 
Development Co-ordinating Committees operate in all regions. In addition, committees such as 
Drought Relief and Orphans Committees, HIV/AIDS committees and so on exist. To compound 
matters, mandates and responsibilities of committees do not necessarily coincide with official 
administrative borders.  
In the land and water sector, the mandates and interactions between the most important institu-
tions vary. Communal Land Boards are responsible for improved land administration and in 
particular improved tenure security. As National Land Policy recognises the role of Traditional 
Leaders in customary land administration, interaction between these two institutions is regular. 
Water Point Users Associations and Water Point Committees on the other hand do not interact 
at all with Land Boards and Traditional Leaders unless the TAs are resident in the WPUA area 
or have designated representatives there. The main reason for this may well be that users of 
water points have obtained full ownership of the resource. At present, land policy and legisla-
tion provides property rights only to individuals who have been granted leasehold. Property 
rights of communities to land only exist in draft form. However, ownership of water points ef-
fectively transfers property rights to grazing in that WPC are empowered by law to exclude 
people from using water points. With no access to water, grazing land becomes useless.  
A critical analysis of current policy and legal framework in the land and water sectors suggests 
certain changes in the institutional landscape of rural areas. Traditional Leaders have the poten-
tial to lose a lot of their current powers. In the water sector, policy and legislation devolved full 
ownership and management responsibility to communities. Although Traditional Leaders tradi-
tionally did not have any powers to control access to water, research in eastern Namibia sug-
gests that WPC may assume land related powers hitherto exercised by Traditional Leaders, thus 
competing for legitimacy with the latter.  
Land policies and legislation are also likely to weaken local level management institutions by 
decreasing powers of traditional leaders and limiting their areas of jurisdiction. However, in-
stead of transferring these powers to groups of land users, the decentralised state acquires these 
powers in the form of Regional Land Boards. Local level land management institutions will thus 
be increasingly marginalised. At present local communities are represented by altogether 4 peo-
ple from across the region for which a Land Board is responsible (one representative of each 
recognised Traditional Authority; one member from the organised farming community in the 
Board’s area and two women engaged in farming activities).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CuveWaters Papers, No. 1 
 
20 
References 
Cox, J./C. Kerven/W. Werner/R. Behnke (1998) The privatisation of rangeland resources in 
Namibia: Enclosure in eastern Oshikoto. London: Overseas Development Institute 
Engel, A. (2004) Namibia. Priority area: natural resources and rural development. Strategy Pa-
per. In RoN and GTZ Namibia Water Resource Management (NMWR) Project 
Huppert, W. (2004) ‘Zur Relevanz der GTZ Erfahrungen im Watershed Management in Indien 
für künftige Watershed-Vorhaben in Namibia.’ Mimeo  
Huppert, W./W. Werner (2006) Namibia Water Resources Management Programme (NWRM). 
Some lessons learnt. A knowledge management report. Eschborn/Windhoek: GTZ 
International Development Consultants (2002) National land use planning policy. Windhoek: 
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Jones, B./O. Kakujaha-Matundu (2006) Promoting environmentally sound-decision-making of 
Communal Land Boards. Report for the Directorate of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism 
Kakujaha-Matundu, O./G. Lekula/A. Sikopo (2004) Capacity assessment of Land Boards in 
Namibia. Windhoek: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Permanent Tech-
nical Team 
Kluge, T./S. Liehr/A. Lux, A./S. Niemann/K. Brunner (2006) IWRM in Northern Namibia – 
Cuvelai Delta. Final report of a preliminary study. Frankfurt/Main: Institut für sozial-ökolo-
gische Forschung (ISOE) 
Lawry, S. (1990) ‘Tenure policy toward common property natural resources in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.’ Natural Resources Journal, Spring 
Meinzen-Dick, R./A. Knox (2001) ‘Collective action, property rights and devolution of natural 
resource  management:  A  conceptual  framework’.  In  Meinzen-Dick,  R./A.  Knox/M.  Di 
Gregorio (eds.) Collective action, property rights and devolution of natural resource man-
agement. Exchange of knowledge and implications for policy. Proceedings of the Interna-
tional  Conference  held  from  21-25  June,  1999  in  Puerto  Azul,  Phillipines.  Feldafing: 
Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung (DSE) 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (sic) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische  Zusammenarbeit  (GTZ)  (2006)  Namibia  Water  Resource  Management 
(NMWR) Project. Planning Workshop Integrated Water Land and Water Management in 
Basins. Background Information. 2-3 March 2006 Oshakati Country Lodge 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (sic) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische  Zusammenarbeit  (GTZ)  (2005)  Namibia  Water  Resource  Management 
(NMWR) Project. Planning Workshop Integrated Water Land and Water Management in 
Basins. 20-21 March 2005 Oshakati Country Lodge 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (sic) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische  Zusammenarbeit  (GTZ)  (2004a)  Namibia  Water  Resource  Management 
(NMWR) Project. Planning Workshop Integrated Water Land and Water Management in 
Basins. 10-11 March 2004 Nampower Convention Centre Windhoek 
Ministry of Agriculture Water and Rural Development (2004b) 10 Years Directorate of Rural 
Water Supply 1993-2003. Windhoek      
 
  21 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (2000) National Water Policy White 
Paper. Policy framework for equitable, efficient and sustainable water resources manage-
ment and water services. Windhoek 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism (2005) Policy review on issues pertinent to the improve-
ment of land management and biodiversity conservation in Namibia. Extended summary. 
Windhoek 
Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (2006) Operational Manual for Communal Land Boards. 
Windhoek 
Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (2005a) Strategic options and action plan for land reform in 
Namibia. Windhoek: MLR/PTT 
Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (2005b) Background Research work and findings of the 
PTT studies. Windhoek: MLR/PTT 
Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (2005c) National Land Tenure Policy. Final Draft. Wind-
hoek: MLRR 
Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing (1997) A decentralisation policy for the 
Republic of Namibia. Decentralisation, development and democracy.  
Nangula, S./G. Oba ‘Effects of artificial water points on semi-arid rangelands in northern Na-
mibia’. Ms for Land degradation and Development 
Niemann, S. (2002) ‘Indigenous water resources management and water utilisation in northern 
Namibia (former Ovamboland) – Can tradition help to overcome current problems?’ in Die 
Erde, 133 
Quan, J. (2000) ‘Land Boards as a mechanism for the management of land rights in Southern 
Africa’. In Toulmin, C./J. Quan (eds.) Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa. 
London: DFID/IIED/NRI 
Twyman, C./D. Sporton/D. Thomas/A. Dougill (2002) ‘Community fencing in open rangelands: 
A case study of community self-empowerment in Eastern Namibia’. Draft paper 
Urban, K./W.  Werner/W. Huppert  (2003)  Namibia. Namibia  Water  Resources  Management 
Review (NMRMR) Project Progress Review Report. Windhoek: GTZ 
Vlachos, J. (1995) Communal land tenure and land degradation. A minor field study of the Elim 
constituency Omusati Region, Namibia. University of Lund 
Water Resources Management Act (2004) 
World Bank (2001) Land policy and administration: Lessons learnt and new challenges for the 
Bank’s development agenda CuveWaters Papers presents results from ongoing
research work in the project ‘Integrated Water Resources
Management in Central Northern Namibia, Cuvelai-Etosha
Basin – CuveWaters’. The joint project is funded within the
programme “Integrated Water Resources Management
(IWRM) including the Necessary Technology and Know-
How Transfers” of the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF).
General editor of this series is the research co-operation
CuveWaters with the following research partners:
■ Institute for Social-Ecological Research (ISOE),
Frankfurt/Germany
■ Fraunhofer Institute for Interfacial Engineering and
Biotechnology (IGB), Stuttgart/Germany
■ Technische Universtität Darmstadt, Chair of Water
Supply and Groundwater Protection 
(WAR Institute), Darmstadt/Germany
www.cuvewaters.net